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NAMIBIAN ECONOMY
Jj>
The Political Economy of SWAPO
SWAPO's political economic thinking did not alter 
substantially over 1980?" It does appear to have evolved 
in certain specific areas as evidenced at the Geneva 
Pre-Implementation Talks, the United Nation's Council for 
Namibia uranium hearings, and the ongoing tactical discussions 
on sanctions among states committed to their use.
At Geneva SWAPO's delegation included several of its 
economic strategists and advisers. Since the PIM was 
not scheduled to discuss constitutional provisions, there 
is some speculation as to why. At least three explanations 
have been advanced. First, that SWAPO wished to be able 
to respond if economic issues beaame part of PIM discussion. 
Second, that SWAPO intended to discuss its economic 
transition views with one or more of the Western Contact 
Group delegations with a view to reassuring them on specific 
questions. Third, that SWAPO thought it might be useful 
to be able to present its broad and/or more detailed economic 
intentions to the world press as part of its campaign to 
overturn the Western press image of a 'band of terrorists' 
and substitute that of a 'responsible government in waiting.'
In the event the first possible purpose never arose since 
only the fringe Federal and Christian Democratic Party
conponents of the South African PIM delegation showed any■ . . . .  2 interest in discussing constitutional or economic issues.
The second apparently did - particularly in respect to
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Germany and France. SWAPO is known to have stressed its
intention to keep Rossing operating and to sell its
uranium oxide on economic criteria to electric power
users - a point of considerable concern to Germany and France.
Further, the German delegation brought with it several
German-speaking business, farming and civil service
residents of Namibia. They are believed to have been
reassured by SWAPO's indication that confiscation of
small businesses, expulsion of responsible farmers and firing
of competent technical civil servants played no part
in its economic transition strategy. Certainly the
position of the German delegation, headed by Foreign
Minister Genscher, was notably harder in respect to
South Africa than previously and was singled out by an
irate Pik Botha as 'unhelpful.'
While the main thrust of SWAPO press contacts at 
Geneva was not economic, President Nijama and one of the 
delegations technical advisers were interviewed by UN 
television on the Namibian economy and SWAPO's views 
on transition. The stark outlining of the colonial 
economy was followed by statements on the need for continued 
production and for radical reform of transnational 
corporation policies (in terms implying the probability 
of a continued role for them).and on ending racial 
inequality in opportunities and incomes (in terms clearly 
accepting the presence of 'white Namibians' and expatriates 
as both necessary and desirable). Similar inclusion of - 
indeed stress on - economic issues was evident at the
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seminar on Namibia and the Nordic countries held by the
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in March 1981
. . 3at Helsinki with the full participation of SWAPO. Sessions
included one on the political economy of transition^
and another - led by SWAPO Secretary for Economic Affairs,
Ben Amethila - on the nationhood programme.
5The United Nations Council for Namibia uranium hearings 
provided a focus on the largest of the post revocation of mandate 
natural resource ventures in Namibia. Rossing has become 
a symbol of South African exploitation and inter­
national corporate/state connivance. It has also - 
apparently somewhat to SWAPO's embarrassment - become a
6symbol for opponents of atomic energy. As SWAPO's evidence 
indicatesfit is not among those opponents but perceives 
Rossing and uranium oxide as a major national asset to 
be utilized to provide finance and foreign exchange for 
Namibia. Its challenges centred on the illegality of the 
Anglo-RTZ-South African agreements, the exploitation 
of workers, doubtful environmental and worker safety not 
necessarily on the presence of some foreign technical 
partner and not at all on the continued production of 
oxide for sale to electric power generation companies.
Sanctions - Toward a Workable Package?
SWAPO has consistently supported sanctions against South 
Africa. Both at the general level and in relation to 
exports of Namibian raw materials (as covered in Decree No. 1 
of the UN Council for Namibia) it has argued that economic 
pressures could help bring South Africa to the conference
4table.
In that sense Central Committee member Peter Katjavivi's 
7article, like SWAPO's statement at the end of the
gGeneva Conference, does not break new ground. However, 
the Non-Aligned and OAV proposals and especially the 
technical work behind the OAV's Sanctions Committee/Committee 
of 19 (on assistance to Front Line States) March 1981 
joint meeting at Arusha, at all three of which SWAPO 
participated, seem to embody a change in tactics.
First, the sanctions resolutions are being put to the
Security Council, but with a fallback position if - as
expected - they are vetoed. That is to convene an
Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly under
the 'uniting for peace' procedure to give considerably more
authority to a sanctions resolution than a simple General
9Assembly resolution.
Second, there is a new stress on operating an oil embargo. 
With the exception of Brunei^every significant net 
oil exporter in principle will not allow shipments to 
South Africa. Detailed information on tanker and company 
violations and how the loopholes might be plugged has 
now been collected and published under the title 
Oil Tankers to South Africa by the Shipping Research 
Bureau (Amsterdam).10
The OAU joint committee meeting brought in three technical
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experts. Two were Bernard Rivers and Martin Bailey 
who have worked on Rhodesian and South African 'oil 
running' for several years, Rivers being the co­
author of Oil Tankers to South Africa. The third was 
R. H. Green who has been involved in dependence re­
direction and regional cooperation studies in
respect to Southern Africa."^ Their selection and the
12conference's press briefings suggest two lines were 
stressed. The first seems to be exploring how to utilize 
OAU and oil exporting country capacity to boycott 
tankers and threaten oil companies' crude supplies (as 
Nigeria has done to some effect) to make an embargo 
backed by a 'uniting for peace resolution' could work.
The second, was how to reduce the impact of oil sanctions 
on the states (Swaziland, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho) now dependent on South Africa for supplies. If 
followed through these approaches mark a shift from 
use of sanctions resolutions as part of a diplomatic 
offensive to actual attempts to implement them. Given 
the make-up of the OAU - net oil exporter group^, they also 
represent a partial shift from appealing for global 
action to a Third World led operation open to support by 
friendly industrial economies (e.g., Norway, Netherlands 
which are critical in respect to tankers, Antilles refining 
and, less clearly, the so-called 'Amsterdam spot market').
Nationhood Programme, Education and UNIN.
The Nationhood Programme of the United Nations and the 
United Nations Institute for Namibia constitute two of the
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larger components in SWAPO's knowledge and personpower 
development strategy. The Nationhood Programme has 
gained momentum - especially on the training side - 
but remains relatively weak on building up a systematic body 
of applied studies for use by policy makers. In person­
power development the range now spans technical education 
for cadres with partial secondary school in Angola to 
post UNIN courses in public enterprise management in 
Yugoslavia and in economic planning at the Economic
Commission for Africa's Institute for Economic Development
13and Planning in Dakar.
UNIN's teaching programme is now well-established with
an integrated year of service in a Front Line State's civil
or public corporate service and an increasing number of
graduates entering SWAPO service or pursuing more specialised
courses. In addition, UNIN's sometimes underrated
applied research programme will by the end of 1981
have conducted studies and seminars on inter alia:
manpower development, constitutional options, agricultural
reform, national language (English) development, education, health,
housing and economic strategy.
The total number of UNIN graduates is currently approaching 
200 with over 250 more enrolled. About 500 other Namibians 
are following tertiary courses and 2,000 to 3,000 
secondary courses (in Angola and Nigeria) including 
vocational ones. The primary enrollment is even more 
substantial, forming part of the increasingly integrated
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health-education-agriculture programmes of SWAPO's 
refugee camps. The introduction of conscription by 
the occupation authorities early in 1981 caused a 
new wave of secondary school student refugees increasing 
both the PLAN cadres and the pool of candidates for 
SWAPO's programmes general and specialised secondary 
and tertiary education.
War and the Namibian Economy
The liberation war is increasingly hampering and 
undermining the colonial economy. It is still far 
from bringing that economy to a halt but is beginning 
to impose substantial costs and raise substantial 
doubts for many individuals and enterprises. For 
South Africa it would appear probable that costs - 
estimated at R 400 million a year in the late 1970s - 
have now reached R 600 million in 1980 including 
the Buffalo Brigade and related anti-Angolan operations.
At the R 600 million level, Namibia is in purely 
national economic terms a liability to South Africa.
Net South African corporate, individual and state earnings 
including exports to Namibia not saleable elsewhere can 
hardly exceed R 450 - 500 million. In pure foreign 
exchange balance terms, the situation is less clear - 
sales to and remittances from Namibia may well exceed 
both the foreign exchange content of normal exports to 
and of military operations in or from Namibia.
The northern third of the 'operational zone' - 
Ovambo, Kavango, Caprivi - has been a labour reserve. 
Therefore, for South Africa or South Africans the 
economic cost of its being caught up in war is low.
For its residents the situation is of course different,
especially given the highly brutal and destructive
style of South African raiding and 'pacification' operations.
However, there is one major cost to the colonial
economy - the constant threat of unuseability of
Ruacana Falls Dam. While water flow has been partially
secured by a command raid on the Caleuque diversion
works in Angola, Ruacana's control station has been mortared
at least once. Further, the long, lonely transmission
lines South have been blown up more than once and -
at least in the empty hills of the Kaokoveld - are
almost impossible to defend. As a result the high
tension power link to the Western Cape is being pushed
15ahead at a cost likely to reach R 50 million.
It is in the central third of the 'operational zone' 
that the situation is most evidently worsening from 
the point of view of the colonial economy and its 
beneficiaries. Grootfontein - Tsumeb - Otavi is 
known as 'the triangle of death', 600 farmers have left 
their ranches (partly linked to prolonged drought in the Outj 
area but most at least in part because of the collapse 
of guaranteed security). Lorries north of Okahandja 
usually move in armed convoy; the Etosha Pan - where
9Howard Keck and Superior Oil of Houston (who control 
Falconbridge) somewhat naively propose to prove and develop 
the very small, known petroleum find - is an operational 
area; threats to the Tsumeb area mine's communications 
(even if not yet to the mine sites themselves) are 
becoming real.
In the Southern tier of the zone (and in Windhoek which 
adjoins it) , there is no direct evidence of armed conflict 
apart from the South African (now rechristened SWA/Namibia 
Territorial Defence Force) military presence. But there 
is continued lack of confidence plus growing caution 
by external investors who perceive it to be unwise 
to sink money before having a clearer view on the future 
political status and economic policies of Namibia.
It is neither accidental nor trivial that DTA says it 
cannot win any election unless it has a two-year
, 16pre-election campaign cease-fire to make the economy work. 
Otherwise, DTA argues SWAPO would win as the party of 
peace and prosperity. The loss of security for ranchers 
and their flight was an especially recurrent theme 
in DTA tirades at Geneva.
The loss of confidence has spread to the South African press. 
'Waiting for Sam1 is now a real headline for a feature on 
Namibia which asserts that all sectors of the population 
view a SWAPO government as inevitable, only a matter of
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17timing and ways and means. In that they agree with
a recent pro-SWAPO analysis 'Unto What End: the crisis
18of colonialism in Namibia' and, interestingly, from 
both of these divergent viewpoints the long 
drawn out, destructive war scenario is perceived to be 
the most damaging.
Economy 1980 - Waiting in Stagnation 
In 1979 the Namibian economy grew at perhaps 2% in 
real terms. Within that production of goods fell 
as higher Rossing uranium oxide production was more than 
offset by lower diamond output while beef offtake 
increases barely exceeded the continued slide in fishing.
The real growth sector appears to have been state 
spending - both recurrent and capital - to prop up 
the DTA and its 'second tier' authorities and to
19facilitate movement of military traffic by road improvement.
1980 outturn is likely to be no better. Rossing has 
reached capacity and an incipient glut in the large, 
high grade (speculative hedge) end of the gem diamond 
market is being met by de Beers with reductions in 
offerings to reverse falls in secondary market prices.
Fishing remains in a slump; cattle production increases 
are limited by South African quotas, inadequate 
abbatoirs for packing to sell to third countries, drought 
and the armed struggle in the extreme and middle north.
Private sector construction remains nearly collapsed -
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the risk is seen as too high. Recent attempts by the DTA to
force mining companies to proceed with active exploration
20and development are unlikely to succeed. The outlook for 
1981 is like 1979 and 1980, slow drift with real growth 
below 3% and possible negative. The only positive sign is the 
possible recommissioning of Otjihase copper mine.
Mining.
Rossing reached - after numerous delays, technical problems
and cost overruns - its rated capacity of 5,200 tonnes a year
of concentrate in mid 1979 and continues at that level.
Prospecting and proving has identified at least three
21broadly comparable uranium possibilities. However, there
is little chance any will be developed before Namibia
achieves an internationally recognised independence and
peace. The most advanced - Langer Heinrich - has a pilot
plant and some shaft work done but the main shareholder
(Federale Mynebou) has clearly put it into cold storage.
Anglo-American and Companie Francaises du Petrole
(the French state-owned energy company) have completed
prospecting and proving but show no signs of moving to
development or production. The same appears to be
22true of Anglo's coal prospects and general exploration 
programme.
Base metal mining remains at semi-depressed levels. The 
1979 mini boom in copper has faded. Several smaller base 
metal mines have run down to a care and maintenance or 
tailings recovery basis. However, Otjihase copper mine is
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in the process of being reactivated. The former main
shareholder - Johannesburg Consolidated of the Anglo
group - has given its controlling interest to Tsumeb
in return for Tsumeb's taking over certain debt
guarantees. Because Tsumeb is the smelter for Otjihase
ore; because Rossing is a market for a byproduct and
because much of the mine cost has been written off, Otjihase is
now probably viable at a New York copper price of about $0.30 -
0.90 per pound. Whether it is in Tsumeb's interest to acquire a
post-revocation of mandate mine (a factor said to have
been relevant to Anglo's disposal) may be another matter.
Rural Production.
24The fishery sector remains at a very low level. Total 
catch in 1980 is unlikely to have exceeded 200,000 tonnes.
The Metal Box plant to provide tins has closed so low 
is demand. Tinned fish is apparently actually being 
imported.
25Livestock, however, has recovered. Prices have turned
up as has the South African quota allocation. To date
this seems to have offset the negative influence of
drought and of the liberation struggle on production.
However, that is not certain - one effect of drought
2 6has been abnormal sales and the same may result from 
ranchers abandoning homesteads as PLAN activities increase.
For the majority of rural households - the Africans 
of the 'operational zone' - the situation has worsened
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markedly. South African response to inability to 
defeat or prevent growing operations by PLAN has been 
increasingly violent. Even the 'centre' parties 
(e.g., SWAPO-D, Christian Democrats) speak of 
atrocities and reigns of terror. Search and destroy 
missions, shooting first and checking who was there 
later and restrictions on movement have had devastating 
effects on African security, quality of life and 
ability to produce. This is by no means offset by 
the DTA 'government' pumping of funds to 'second tier' 
authorities as these are used to buy the loyalty of 
quite limited numbers of politicians, petty officials 
and militia, not for more broadly based production 
assistance, social services or relief operations.
Economic Data
The South African authorities have finally revealed
detailed Gross Domestic Product figures on Namibia
(excluding Walvis Bay) and, by reconsolidating the budget
2 7on a SWA/Namibia basis, on public finance. The results
are revealing and strongly support the critical analysts'
2 8perceptions as opposed to the previous official line.
GDP in 1979 is now stated to have been R 1,213.2 million. 
Adjusting for Walvis Bay (fishing, fish processing, 
manufacturing, harbour, railway, commerce, public 
administration), this implies a quasi-official Namibian 
figure in the R 1,350 - 1,400 million range. Unofficial 
estimates are broadly canparable - the most detailed for
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1979 being R 1,425 million.2^
The data also confirm the dominance of mining - 50% odd in 
1978 and 1979— and its total domination of post 1976 physical 
goods growth. They also confirm low real growth in 1978 
and 1979, radical decline in fishing since 1976 and 
fluctuating fortunes for ranching.
On the face of it, fixed investment is of the order of
31.c 30 However, closer examination reveals that20-6 of GDP.
75-80% is state and state corporation investment, the 
bulk of it in 'second tier' infrastructure, in roads whose 
primary use is military and - from 1980 - in replacing the 
'lost' Ruacana Falls power. For mining, investment appears 
to be down to 5 to 6% of value added^almost totally in 
replacement of assets and prospecting. Indeed, the 
figures suggest deferral of maintenance and a failure to 
maintain productive capacity.
In 1979-80 there was a surplus on the SWA/Namibia budget
of R 24.5 million. This is quite consistent with some
33previous outside estimates but not with RSA and apologist 
claims that the Republic heavily subsidised Namibia.
In 1979-80 it appears that about R375 million was spent 
on the main (South African) SWA account and R 75 million 
(net of a transfer of R 57.5 million to the SWA account) 
by the SWA Territorial account as well as R 40 million by 
local authorities for a total of about R 500 million
- 15
non-military expenditure.
The 19 80-81 budget is on a somewhat different and non-comparable
basis. First, the old (South African) SWA account has
been 'repatriated' as the SWA/Namibia Budget and second,
some services have been transferred to the SWA Territorial
(de facto apparently now 'second tier' Europear} Budget.
The expenditure estimate for the first is R 520 million
against R 332 million basic revenue. The latter represents
34a decline from a 1979/80 actual of R 400 million because 
of lower anticipated taxes on diamond profits (output 
and sales fell in 1980) and an end to the Territorial 
Fund transfer.
The apparent deficit of R 188 million is probably unreal 
for three reasons. First, capital spending has regularly 
fallen short of estimates. Second, there is no self- 
evident reason to believe in the complete cessation of 
receipts from the Territorial Fund. Third, revenue has 
tended in recent years to be underestimated. Together, 
these three factors would seem likely to account for 
R100-150 million, leaving a plausible 1980-1981 financing 
requirement (toward the R 200 million odd capital component 
in the budget) of R 40 - 90 million.
Toward this R24.5 million 1979/80 surplus, R 15 million
from a Stabilisation Account and R 20 million borrowed
on the South African market were available at the
35opening of the budget year. Also available was a
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R 40 million 1979/80 RSA contribution and a potential 
1980/81 contribution of another R 40 million. If used, these 
would represent actual use of South African government finance 
for up to 40% of the capital budget after at least two 
and probably three years of total self finance. Whether 
both (or indeed either) will have been used is unclear, 
the revised deficit projection could be covered with the 
existing sources and a second commercial loan.
Labour and Prices.
In 1980 the Administrator General promulgated a new trade 
union ordinance. In effect it is based on the South 
African Wiehan Report with provision for registered African 
trade unions and - unlike Wiehan - for unified non racial 
trade unions. This legislation, while on the face of it 
relatively permissive, has remained a dead letter and is 
probably intended for international public relations 
use, not for seeking to create a docile, managed set of 
registered Namibian unions.
Certainly the experience of those actually trying to 
organise Namibian workers during 1980 suggested no 
change in the authorities' hostility. Pastor Gerson Max, 
long involved in publicizing worker conditions and assisting 
worker organisation^was detained or under house arrest 
during much of the year. Arthur Pickering, a leader in the 
attempt to organise Rossing workers, was finally driven 
into exile. The National Union of Namibian Workers did 
indeed continue to organise - and to develop union personnel
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training courses in Angola and jointly with Finnish
trade unions - but clandestinely and with continued
opposition from the occupation authorities and most 
36employers.
During 1978 prices rose by 9.2% while retail sales in 
money terms were static. In 1979 the price increase was 
12.2% and the retail sales growth 11.1%. Adjusting the 
retail sales for the relevant price index components shows a 
10% fall for 1978 and a 1% fall for 1979 in real terms or 
about a 15 - 17%% per capita fall for the two years. ^
1980 price increases are expected to have been of the same 
order of magnitude or higher. In particular the railway 
tariffs (and almost certainly road tariffs) were adjusted 
upward by 10 to 17% in early 1980. In an economy with a 
high proportion of transport costs the results are likely 
to have weighed heavily on livestock producers and 
on consumers. Another decrease in per capita retail sales 
for 1980 of 3 to 5% would, therefore, seem likely.
The distribution of this fall in consumption is less clear. 
European wages and salaries may have lagged inflation 
but not by much. The same holds for Africans working for 
major enterprises but almost certainly not to the majority 
working for small business, ranch or household employers.
The net incomes of smaller European businesses (especially 
ranchers and trawler operators) have declined sharply. The 
hardest hit in relative terms are African wage-seeking
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unemployed - growing with economic stagnation - and
African rural households whose production possibilities
have been dislocated by the repressive South African reactions
to the war and whose income- from migrant family members
has been cut by job losses and the scissors impact
of rising urban living costs and stagnant small
employer payments to African workers.
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